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JURISDICTION 
This Petition is brought pursuant to Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for 
the reason that the Court's opinion filed on December 21, 1995 (the "Opinion"), overlooks or 
misapprehends the applicable points of law and fact which underlie the dispute. 
CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned, as counsel for Petitioners/Appellees, certifies that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
ISSUE 
One of the principal issues addressed in the Opinion is whether the transaction between 
Physicians1 and IHC which occurred or May 24, 1990 (the "Transaction"), was a "Purchase 
of Center" as that term is defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. The Court 
erroneously answered this question in the affirmative because it misconstrued the Termination 
Agreement and did not have an opportunity to review the Transaction documents. 
OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED POINTS OF LAW AND FACT 
1. The Court Misconstrued the Termination Agreement. 
Whether the Transactions constituted a "Purchase of Center," as that term is 
defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement ("Paragraph 11"), is not simply a 
question of whether the Transactions constituted a "sale" in an abstract sense. It is a question 
of whether the Transaction satisfied the intent of the parties. 
1
 For the Court's convenience, this Petition will use the same definitions as are in the Opinion. 
1 
Prior to the Termination Agreement, Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center2 had a 
Professional Services Contract and Lease with Rehabilitation. The Termination Agreement 
transferred Rehabilitation's interest in certain assets to Physicians who, in turn, paid money to 
Rehabilitation, which, in turn, enabled Rehabilitation to satisfy certain debts. Paragraph 11 was 
designed to compensate Rehabilitation if, after the termination and within two years, Physicians 
sold the business of the Center to a third party and were no longer involved in that business. 
The essential elements of a "sale," as defined in Paragraph 11, are: 
a transfer to "any third party" wherein: 
"the Purchaser" 
(i) "acquires and pays consideration for" 
"all" of: 
(1) the lease; 
(2) ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center"; 
(3) all of the equipment and other assets located 
at the Center; 
(4) the Center's patients and accounts 
receivable; and 
(ii) assumes complete operational control of the business of the 
Center; and 
2
 The Termination Agreement defines Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center as "Medicine," not as "Center," and never 
defines the term "Center." Medicine was a separate entity. First Recital, Termination Agreement, Record at 8. 
2 
(iii) continues operating under the same name at the same 
location. 
The flaw in the Opinion is the erroneous assumption that "any third party" means the same as 
"a separate entity," and that a partnership, substantially owned and controlled by Physicians, is 
a separate, independent "third party" purchaser, with separate and independent operational 
control of the business. 
a. The Transaction was not a transfer to a "third party." 
Contrary to the main Opinion, the term "third party" was never intended to be 
and is not synonymous with "separate legal entity" in the factual context of the case. While a 
joint venture or general partnership may be a separate legal entity to hold property and transact 
business with non-partners, it is not a separate entity from its partners. The Court's Opinion 
misses this crucial distinction. The partners are co-owners of the partnership's business. They 
have an equal right to manage the business. They hold the partnership's property as "tenants 
in partnership" and they are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership. 
A general partnership is not a separate legal entity from its partners — it is a business entity "of 
its partners." Thus, a contribution to a general partnership by a partner is not a transfer to "a 
third party." 
The Court's opinion not only exalts form over substance, but it transforms, by 
legal edict, the genuine factual intent of the parties when they placed specific conditions on what 
would constitute a "sale to a third party" in Paragraph 11. 
Several simple but clear illustrations demonstrate the fallacious conclusions which 
would result if the main Opinion in permitted to stand: 
3 
Exemplar 1 
Physicians transfer all of the assets of the Center to a corporation 
in which they own 100% of the stock. It would not be a transfer "to a 
third party," because Physicians would continue to own and control the 
business, through their ownership of the corporation's stock. No good 
will has been exchanged, no one has "paid consideration" for good will, 
and operational control remains in the same hands. Yet, under the 
Opinion the corporation is a "separate legal entity," and though no outside 
parties are involved, such a transaction would be a "sale" under Paragraph 
11. 
Exemplar 2 
Physicians transfer all of the assets of the Center to XYZ Limited 
Partnership, with Physicians as general partners, and Drs. E,, F, and G 
as limited partners. As general partners, Physicians continue to have 
complete operational control of the Center. No good will has been 
exchanged, and no one has "paid any consideration" for good will. No 
outside parties have obtained operational control of the Center. Yet, 
under the Court's decision, XYZ Limited Partnership is a "separate legal 
entity," and though no outside parties have acquired the good will or 
control of the Center, such a transaction would be a "sale" under 
Paragraph 11. 
Exemplar 3 
Physicians transfer all of the assets of the center to ABC Limited 
Liability Company, with Physicians as sole managers under the LLC's 
operating agreement. An unrelated third person also becomes a member 
of the LLC by contributing cash to the LLC. No good will has been 
exchanged, no one has "paid any consideration" for the assets or the good 
will of the Center, and there has been no transfer of "complete operational 
control" of the Center. Yet, under the Court's Opinion, ABC is a 
"separate legal entity," and, though no outside parties have acquired 
"complete operational control" over the Center as required by Paragraph 
11, such a transaction would be a "sale" under Paragraph 11. 
Reasonable construction of the Termination Agreement's language requires a 
finding that Paragraph 11 was intended to prevent a windfall on the part of Physicians resulting 
from a sale of the good will of the Center, should they decide to divest themselves entirely of 
4 
their interests in the Center. Paragraph 11 was not inserted to prevent Drs. Paulos and 
Rosenberg from enjoying the beneficial use of the Center's assets, for which they had already 
paid Rehabilitation. 
The Transaction in question is no different from the transactions in the preceding 
examples, with the exception that a joint venture partnership was used instead of a corporation, 
a limited liability company or a limited partnership. Viewed as a simultaneous integrated event, 
Physicians began the Transaction as owners of the business and ended the Transaction as owners 
of the business, holding, with IHC, an undivided 50% joint venture interest. The Transaction 
simply was not a sale "to a third party" where the Physicians gave up "complete operational 
control" as contemplated in Paragraph 11. It merely was a change in thtform of the business, 
which permitted Physicians to bring in an additional partner. The joint venture, Sports Medicine 
West, is not "a third party," which assumed "complete operational control of the business," it 
is a related party whose owners, namely, Physicians and IHC, retained undivided and complete 
operational control. 
b. The Transaction merely recapitalized the existing business owned by 
Physicians. 
When Physicians transferred an undivided one-half interest in the Center to IHC 
for cash, they created a de facto joint venture between themselves and IHC. Rehabilitation does 
not, and cannot, contend that this transfer, alone, was a "sale" within the meaning of Paragraph 
11. The simultaneous transfer by Physicians and IHC of their respective joint venture interests 
to a new joint venture called "Sports Medicine West" is merely a change in the form of the 
existing joint venture. This change in form permitted a recapitalization of the venture and 
allowed additional assets to be brought into the venture. At the end of the day, Physicians were 
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still co-owners and tenants in partnership with IHC, just as they were after they sold their one-
half interest in the Center to IHC for cash. Moreover, as partners and co-owners of Sports 
Medicine West, Physicians had an equal right with IHC to possess and use the joint venture's 
property, and exercise operational control over the Center. §§ 48-l-22(2)(a) and 48-1-21(3), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
The Court's analysis of the Transaction caused it to lose sight of the intent of the 
parties when they signed the Termination Agreement. Paragraph 11 was intended to preclude 
Physicians from retaining all of the profit from a complete disposition of the Center where, after 
the sale, Physicians would no longer be involved in the business. It was not intended as a noose 
to prevent Physicians from restructuring the business to better use the assets they had purchased 
from Rehabilitation, nor was it designed to prevent Physicians from bringing in additional equity 
partners so that the business could grow and expand. The Court's interpretation of the 
Termination Agreement does not fulfill the spirit of the document and, for that reason, the Court 
should reconsider its decision. 
c. If this Court does not affirm, it should reverse and remand on all issues. 
Faced with these undisputed facts, this Court either should have (a) affirmed the 
lower Court's grant of Summary Judgment, by concluding that the Transaction was not a sale 
of the Center to a third party as defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, or (b) 
reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the Transaction was of 
the type contemplated by the parties at the time they made the Termination Agreement. In Ward 
v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 277 Utah Adv. Rep. 58, (Utah Supreme Court, 
6 
November 15, 1995), a case decided after the Briefs were filed in the instant appeal, Justice 
Durham wrote: 
Accordingly, we have held that a court may consider extrinsic evidence 
if the meaning of the contract is ambiguous or uncertain, [citations 
omitted] When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the termination of ambiguity is 
inherently one-sided. Namely, it is based solely on the "extrinsic 
evidence of the Judge's own linguistic education and experience." 
[citations omitted] Although the terms of an instrument may seem clear 
to a particular reader — including a Judge — this does not rule out the 
possibility that the parties chose the language of the agreement to 
express a different meaning. A Judge should therefore consider any 
credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 60. 
In the instant case, Rehabilitation filed two Affidavits in support of its Counter 
Motion for Summary Judgment3. Physicians filed three Affidavits in Opposition to the Counter 
Motion for Summary Judgment4, they filed a Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of 
Rehabilitation's Affidavits5 and, finally, they filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit6 which, among other 
things, indicated that the Defendants had not had adequate time to conclude discovery with 
respect to the claims and arguments asserted by Rehabilitation. Since Physicians prevailed on 
their Motion for Summary Judgment, the lower court never ruled on any evidentiary matters 
underlying Rehabilitation's Motion. In the lower court, Physicians argued that the contract was 
not ambiguous and, in light of the Transaction, that Summary Judgment should be granted for 
3
 Affidavit of Greg Gardner, Record at 233-237; Affidavit of Doug Toole, Record at 238-250. 
4
 Affidavit of Gene Oakes, Record at 271-274; Affidavit of Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., Record at 275-279; 
Affidavit of Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., Record at 280-284. 
5
 Record at 285-289. 
6
 Record at 290-293. 
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Physicians as a matter of law. The trial court agreed. In effect, this Court's Opinion interprets 
the contract in a manner different than the same document was interpreted by the trial court. 
The Opinion is evidence that the contract is subject to different interpretations and that its 
meaning is at least ambiguous or uncertain. Thus, parol evidence would be appropriate to 
consider the intent of the parties, on all issues, not merely those relating to use of the name. 
In interpreting a contract, the reviewing court must give effect to the language of the 
document as it was intended by the parties. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 
110 (Utah App. 1990); LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); and Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984). There is significant evidence in the record to 
suggest that formation of a new partnership to operate the business was not a transaction 
contemplated by Rehabilitation at the time it negotiated Paragraph 11. Paragraph 3 in the 
Gardner Affidavit, Record at 234, and paragraph 4 in the Toole Affidavit, Record at 239, 
contain the following identical language: 
Over the course of working with the Defendants [Physicians], the parties began 
negotiations with IHC Hospitals, Inc., and HCA/St. Mark's for the purchase of 
the Center. On one occasion in approximately early 1987 [Gardner and Toole] 
had the opportunity to meet with agents of IHC in the course of these 
negotiations. We met at LDS Hospital on the Eighth Avenue with Marlin 
Shields, Head of Therapy Management, the physical therapy arm of LDS Hospital 
and an administrator by the name of Mr. Christensen. The negotiations revolved 
around the purchase by IHC of the entire Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. To 
the best of my knowledge, at no time prior to the execution of the Termination 
Agreement between the parties was the concept of a joint venture with IHC 
discussed and/or negotiated. (Emphasis added) 
Since Rehabilitation did not even consider the concept of a joint venture at the time it discussed 
and negotiated the Termination Agreement, such a transaction could not have been contemplated 
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as a "sale" under Paragraph 11. This Court should permit a trier of fact to determine the intent 
of the parties rather, than presume such intent. 
2. The Court Did Not Have the Entire Record to Review. 
In preparing to file this Petition for Rehearing, Physicians' counsel discovered that 
the Record on Appeal did not include the documents which were submitted by the Plaintiff for 
in-camera review. Eleven separate documents were submitted under seal,7 including the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, the Joint Venture Agreement of Sports Medicine West and the 
Management Agreement which were among the very documents considered and interpreted by 
the Court in its Opinion. For unexplained reasons, these sealed documents were not part of the 
record on appeal to which the Court had access for resolving the dispute.8 
The sealed documents are critical to a full understanding of the Transaction. If 
the Court had reviewed these documents9, it would have reached a different conclusion about 
the Transaction and about its effect under the Termination Agreement. For example, in the 
Opinion, the Court says: 
Sports Medicine West also has complete operational control of the Center 
as evidenced by the terms of the Management Agreement stating that 
Sports Medicine West had complete "day-to-day" operational control of 
the rehabilitation of the business. Opinion at 17. 
Section 4.1 of the Joint Venture Agreement, which was missing from the record, actually 
provides: 
7
 Record at 226. 
8
 See, Affidavit of Mark 0. Morris, Esq., dated January 24, 1996. 
9
 Physicians presume that the Court must have relied on statements in the briefs about what the documents said, and 
not on the actual language in the agreements. 
9 
Except as may be specified to the contrary elsewhere in this Agreement, 
the Venture Partners, together, operating through the Governing Board, 
shall have full, exclusive and complete discretion in the management 
and control of the business of the Joint Venture and shall have power 
to make all decisions affecting the Joint Venture's affairs. The voting 
powers of the Joint Venture shall be held by the Venture Partners in 
accordance with their respective Proportionate Shares. (Emphasis added) 
Joint Venture Agreement, paragraph 4.1, page 11. 
As defined in the Joint Venture Agreement, the "Venture Partners" are Physicians and IHC. 
As Venture Partners, Physicians had complete operational control of the Center 
and, having such control, entered into the Management Agreement. At no time did an outside 
purchaser have or "assume complete operational control of the business" as specifically required 
by the terms of Paragraph 11. Subject only to the terms of the agreement between them, all 
partners of a joint venture partnership have "equal rights in the management and the conduct of 
the partnership business." § 48-1-15(5), Utah Code Ann. (1994). No act in contravention of 
any agreement between partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the partners. 
§ 48-1-15(8), Utah Code Ann. (1994). At the start of the day on May 24, 1990, Physicians had 
control of the Center and, at the end of the same day, they still had control of the Center. Thus, 
an essential element of Paragraph 11 was not satisfied, namely, the assumption of complete 
operational control by a third party other than Physicians. 
In addition, one of the other essential elements of a "sale" under Paragraph 11 is the 
purchase, for consideration, of the "ownership of the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center.'" 
Rehabilitation did not produce evidence that this name was ever transferred to Sports Medicine 
West. In fact, the name was not purchased by Sports Medicine West as is clear from a review 
of the sealed Transaction documents. None of these Transaction documents specifically mention 
10 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" as an asset being sold or transferred.10 It is a 
material question of fact as to whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was ever 
transferred or intended to be transferred as part of the Transaction. Whether the name was 
"used" by Sports Medicine West is irrelevant, if such use was unauthorized because the name 
was not owned. 
By not having the entire record, this Court's ability to fairly review and decide 
the issues on appeal was impaired, and, as a result, the Court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court overlooked or misapprehended the material points of law and fact underlying 
one of the primary issues in this Appeal. Moreover, the Court did not have the entire record 
before it in deciding this issue. Accordingly, granting a rehearing of this matter will give the 
Court an opportunity to fairly reconsider the law and the facts, and avoid an injustice to the 
parties. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of January, 1996. 
SNELL & WILMER L ^ 
David^E. Lata, fl£sq: v^  
Mark O. Morris, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
10
 Rehabilitation assumes that the name was transferred because the Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment 
from Physicians and IHC to Sports Medicine West transferred "miscellaneous personal property" and "general 
intangibles," but the Transaction documents never mention the name. 
11 
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